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ABSTRACT
Full Name : Akram Abdul-GhaniHezam
Thesis Title : Using Security Robustness Analysis for Early Stage Validation of 
Functional Security Requirements
Major Field : Information and Computer Science
Date of Degree : December, 2013
Security is nowadays an indispensable requirement in software systems. Traditional 
software engineering processes focus primarily on business requirements, leaving 
security as an afterthought to be addressed via generic “patched-on” defensive 
mechanisms. This approach is insufficient and software systems need to have 
security functionality engineered within in a similar fashion as ordinary business 
functional requirements. Functional security requirements need to be elicited, 
analyzed, specified and validated at the early stages of the development life-cycle. If 
the functional security requirements were not properly validated, then there is a risk 
of developing a system that is insecure, deeming it unusable. Acceptance testing is 
an effective technique to validate requirements. However, an ad-hoc approach to 
develop acceptance tests will suffer the omission of important tests. Moreover, 
acceptance testing is only leveraged in agile development methodologies. This thesis
presents a systematic approach to develop executable acceptance tests that is 
specifically geared for model-based secure software engineering processes. The 
approach utilizes early stage artifacts, namely misuse case and domain models, and 
robustness diagrams. It also requires a skill set that can be effectively used and 
communicated by non-technical stakeholders. The feasibility of the proposed 
xiii
approach is demonstrated by applying it to a real-world system – the Faculty Search 
Committee system. The results show that a comprehensive set of security acceptance 
tests can be developed based upon misuse case models for early stage validation of 
functional security requirements.
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ﻣﻠﺨﺺ اﻟﺮﺳﺎﻟﺔ
أﻛﺮم ﻋﺒﺪ اﻟﻐﻨﻲ ﺣﺰام ﻣﺤﻤﺪ:اﻻﺳﻢ اﻟﻜﺎﻣﻞ
أﻧﻈﻤﺔ اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت ﻓﻲ ﻣﺮاﺣﻠﮭﺎ اﻟﻤﺒﻜﺮ ﺳﺘﺨﺪام ﺗﺤﻠﯿﻞ ﻣﺘﺎﻧﺔ اﻟﺤﻤﺎﯾﺔ ﻟﻠﺘﺤﻘﻖ ﻣﻦ ﺻﺤﺔ ﻣﺘﻄﻠﺒﺎت ﺣﻤﺎﯾﺔا:ﻋﻨﻮان اﻟﺮﺳﺎﻟﺔ
ﻋﻠﻮم اﻟﺤﺎﺳﺐ اﻵﻟﻲ:اﻟﺘﺨﺼﺺ
3102دﯾﺴﻤﺒﺮ :ﺗﺎرﯾﺦ اﻟﺪرﺟﺔ اﻟﻌﻠﻤﯿﺔ
ﺗﺮﻛﺰ ﻋﻤﻠﯿﺎت ھﻨﺪﺳﺔ اﻟﺒﺮﻣﺠﯿﺎت اﻟﺘﻘﻠﯿﺪﯾﺔ . اﻷﻣﻦ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻮﻗﺖ اﻟﺤﺎﺿﺮ ھﻮ ﺷﺮط ﻻ ﻏﻨﻰ ﻋﻨﮫ ﻓﻲ أﻧﻈﻤﺔ اﻟﺒﺮﻣﺠﯿﺎت
. ﺣﯿﺚ ﯾﺘﻢ ﻣﻌﺎﻟﺠﺘﮭﺎ ﻋﺒﺮ آﻟﯿﺎت دﻓﺎﻋﯿﺔ ﻋﺎﻣﺔﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﻘﺎم اﻷول ﻋﻠﻰ ﻣﺘﻄﻠﺒﺎت اﻟﻌﻤﻞ، وﺗﺘﺮك اﻷﻣﻦ إﻟﻰ ﻣﺮﺣﻠﺔ ﻻﺣﻘﺔ 
وﺗﻌﺘﺒﺮ ھﺬا اﻟﻄﺮﯾﻘﺔ ﻏﯿﺮ ﻛﺎﻓﯿﺔ، وﺗﺤﺘﺎج ﻣﺘﻄﻠﺒﺎت ﺣﻤﺎﯾﺔ أﻧﻈﻤﺔ اﻟﺒﺮﻣﺠﯿﺎت ﻟﮭﻨﺪﺳﺘﮭﺎ ﺑﻄﺮﯾﻘﺔ ﻣﻤﺎﺛﻠﺔ ﻟﮭﻨﺪﺳﺔ اﻟﻤﺘﻄﻠﺒﺎت 
ﺣﯿﺚ ﺗﺘﻄﻠﺐ ﻣﺘﻄﻠﺒﺎت اﻷﻣﻦ إﻟﻰ أن ﺗﺴﺘﺨﺮج وﺗﺤﻠﻞ وﺗﺤﺪد وﯾﺘﺤﻘﻖ ﻣﻦ ﺻﺤﺘﮭﺎ ﻓﻲ اﻟﻤﺮاﺣﻞ اﻟﻤﺒﻜﺮة . اﻟﻮﻇﯿﻔﯿﺔ اﻟﻌﺎدﯾﺔ
إذا ﻟﻢ ﯾﺘﻢ اﻟﺘﺤﻘﻖ ﻣﻦ ﺻﺤﺔ اﻟﻤﺘﻄﻠﺒﺎت ﻟﺤﻤﺎﯾﺔ أﻧﻈﻤﺔ اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت ﺑﺸﻜﻞ ﺻﺤﯿﺢ، ﻓﺴﻮف . ﯿﺔ ﺗﻄﻮر اﻟﺒﺮﻣﺠﯿﺎتﻣﻦ ﻋﻤﻠ
اﺧﺘﺒﺎر ﻗﺒﻮل اﻟﺒﺮﻣﺠﯿﺎت ﯾﻌﺘﺒﺮ إﺳﻠﻮب  .ﻧﻮاﺟﮫ ﺧﻄﺮ ﺗﻄﻮﯾﺮ ﻧﻈﺎم ﻏﯿﺮ آﻣﻦ، وﺑﺎﻟﺘﺎﻟﻲ ﺳﯿﻜﻮن ﻏﯿﺮ ﺻﺎﻟﺢ ﻟﻼﺳﺘﻌﻤﺎل
ﻟﺘﻄﻮﯾﺮ اﺧﺘﺒﺎرات اﻟﻘﺒﻮل ﯾﻌﺎﻧﻲ ﻣﻦ ﺗﺠﺎھﻞ وﻣﻊ ذﻟﻚ، ﻓﺈن ھﺬا اﻟﻤﻨﮭﺞ اﻟﻤﺨﺼﺺ . ﻓﻌﺎل ﻟﻠﺘﺤﻘﻖ ﻣﻦ ﺻﺤﺔ اﻟﻤﺘﻄﻠﺒﺎت
وﻋﻼوة ﻋﻠﻰ ذﻟﻚ، ﯾﺘﻢ اﺳﺘﺨﺪام اﺧﺘﺒﺎر اﻟﻘﺒﻮل ﻓﻘﻂ ﻓﻲ أﻃﺮ ﻋﻤﻞ أﺟﺎﯾﻞ ﻟﺘﻄﻮﯾﺮ اﻟﺒﺮﻣﺠﯿﺎت . ﺑﻌﺾ اﻻﺧﺘﺒﺎرات اﻟﮭﺎﻣﺔ
وﺗﻌﺮض ھﺬه اﻟﺮﺳﺎﻟﺔ ﻃﺮﯾﻘﺔ ﻣﻨﮭﺠﯿﺔ ﻟﺘﻄﻮﯾﺮ اﺧﺘﺒﺎرات اﻟﻘﺒﻮل اﻟﻘﺎﺑﻠﺔ ﻟﻠﺘﻨﻔﯿﺬ ﺑﺤﯿﺚ ﺗﻜﻮن ﻣﻮﺟﮭﺔ . ﻋﻠﻰ وﺟﮫ اﻟﻌﻤﻮم
وﺗﻘﻮم ھﺬه اﻟﻄﺮﯾﻘﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ اﺳﺘﺨﺪام اﻟﻮﺛﺎﺋﻖ اﻟﻨﺎﺗﺠﺔ ﻣﻦ . ھﻨﺪﺳﺔ اﻟﺒﺮﻣﺠﯿﺎت اﻵﻣﻨﺔ اﻟﻤﺴﺘﻨﺪة اﻟﻨﻤﺎذج ﺧﺼﯿﺼﺎ ﻟﻌﻤﻠﯿﺎت
ﻛﻤﺎ ﯾﺘﻄﻠﺐ . اﻟﻤﺮاﺣﻞ اﻟﻤﺒﻜﺮة ﻟﺘﻄﻮﯾﺮ اﻟﺒﺮﻣﺠﯿﺎت ، وھﻲ ﺣﺎﻟﺔ ﺳﻮء اﻻﺳﺘﺨﺪام وﻧﻤﺎذج اﻟﻤﺠﺎل، واﻟﺮﺳﻮم اﻟﺘﺼﻤﯿﻤﯿﺔ
. ﻞ اﻟﻤﺴﺘﻔﯿﺪﯾﻦ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻨﻈﺎم ﻣﻦ ﻏﯿﺮ اﻟﺘﻘﻨﯿﯿﻦﻣﺠﻤﻮﻋﺔ ﻣﻦ اﻟﻤﮭﺎرات اﻟﺘﻲ ﯾﻤﻜﻦ اﺳﺘﺨﺪاﻣﮭﺎ ﺑﺸﻜﻞ ﻓﻌﺎل وإﯾﺼﺎﻟﮭﺎ ﻣﻦ ﻗﺒ
ﻧﻈﺎم اﻟﺒﺤﺚ ﻋﻦ أﻋﻀﺎء ھﯿﺌﺔ ﺗﺪرﯾﺲ  –وﺗﺘﺠﻠﻰ ﺟﺪوى ھﺬه اﻟﻄﺮﯾﻘﺔ اﻟﻤﻘﺘﺮﺣﺔ ﻋﻦ ﻃﺮﯾﻖ ﺗﻄﺒﯿﻘﮭﺎ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻧﻈﺎم ﻓﻲ اﻟﻮاﻗﻊ 
وﻗﺪ أﻇﮭﺮت اﻟﻨﺘﺎﺋﺞ أن ﻣﺠﻤﻮﻋﺔ ﺷﺎﻣﻠﺔ ﻣﻦ اﺧﺘﺒﺎرات ﻗﺒﻮل ﺣﻤﺎﯾﺔ اﻟﻨﻈﺎم ﯾﻤﻜﻦ ﺗﻄﻮﯾﺮھﺎ اﺳﺘﻨﺎدا إﻟﻰ ﻧﻤﺎذج . ﻓﻲ ﻛﻠﯿﺔ
.اﻻﺳﺘﺨﺪام ﻟﻠﺘﺤﻘﻖ ﻣﻦ ﺻﺤﺔ ﻣﺘﻄﻠﺒﺎت ﺣﻤﺎﯾﺔ أﻧﻈﻤﺔ اﻟﻤﻌﻠﻮﻣﺎت ﻓﻲ ﻣﺮاﺣﻠﮭﺎ اﻟﻤﺒﻜﺮةﺣﺎﻟﺔ إﺳﺎءة 
1CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introductory Background
Nowadays, software systems are rarely developed to operate in a stand-alone mode. All 
software systems are connected to other systems that may inflict harm and therefore 
defensive mechanisms need to be in place in order to mitigate such threats. It is also 
unrealistic to assume that human users of software systems will always intend to use it in 
a legitimate manner. Misuse of software systems by humans must also be addressed. 
Traditional methods of software development focus on the implementation of business-
related functional requirements while addressing security issues towards the end of the 
development process. Security is addressed by supplementing the end system with 
defensive mechanisms such as firewalls, cryptography and IDS (Intrusion Detection 
System). Research evidence has proven that such approaches to address security related 
concerns is insufficient and will likely cause costly reworks in addition to any intangible 
consequences caused by a security breach [Jürjens, Matulevicius,Røstad]. To avoid these 
costly reworks, security concerns need to be addressed as early as the requirements 
engineering phase. To this end, secure software engineering has recently become a very 
active area of research.
Functional requirements validation is a crucial activity in any software development 
process. Overlooking requirements validation can lead to the development of the 
incorrect system (a system that does not satisfy its functional requirements). Similarly, 
2functional security requirements need to be validated. Failure to validate functional 
security requirements can lead to the development of an insecure system. A mis/use case 
model can be used as a basis for requirements validation. However, the requirements 
validation process can be made more rigorous using acceptance testing[Sauvé].
Acceptance testing in the requirements engineering phase can be very beneficial as it is 
cost effective. Acceptance testing provides a new viewpoint for customers to validate a 
system’s requirements through a set of tests (i.e. understanding through examples of use). 
In a secure software engineering process, acceptance testing is equally beneficial since it 
can be used as a basis for early stage validation of functional security requirements. The 
development of these tests and dry-running their expected outputs also provides 
developers with a more accurate understanding of a system’s expected behavior. The 
developed acceptance tests can be used to define acceptable external quality, to refine the 
requirements specifications, and to track a project’s progress. The tests can be created 
using simple syntax which allows them to be developed quickly while being 
understandable to non-technical stakeholders. The syntax used to create the acceptance 
tests, although simple, is sufficient to make them machine executable. The literature 
constantly urges for increased customer involvement during requirements construction 
and system evaluation and acceptance testing partially fulfills this perceived need 
[Agarwal, Good, Goodhue, Gould, Gould-b, Gould-c, Mantei, Rosson].
The current state of practice finds acceptance testing almost exclusively deployed in agile 
processes. Since acceptance tests are developed based on requirements artifacts, therefore 
they are often constructed from user stories [Cohn]. It will be advantageous to reap the 
benefits of acceptance testing in large-scale development projects. However, large-scale 
3development projects do not use user stories. Large-scale development projects deploy a 
more rigorous, model-oriented, development process such as the V-Model. The UML is 
commonly used in such large-scale projects. In the requirements engineering process, 
functional requirements are elicited, communicated and modeled as use cases. Although 
use case modeling is a very popular technique in industry, it does not support the 
elicitation and specification of functional security requirements. To counter this deficit, 
use case modeling has been extended by Sindreand Opdahl [Sindre] to account for 
functional security requirements. The extended modeling technique is named misuse case 
modeling [Sindre]. The misuse case modeling technique has emerged during the past 
decade as a promising technique to elicit and model functional security requirements 
[Alexander, den Barber, Houmb, Sindre]. Misuse cases define improper usage scenarios 
of a system by its external entities that may lead to harmful consequences in a very 
similar way by in which use cases describe legitimate usage instances. The literature has 
already reported a number of successful industrial experiences with misuse case 
modeling [Alexander, Alexander-b, Ekremsvi, Mæhre, Diallo, Stålhane]. In order to reap 
the benefits of acceptance testing in large-scale projects and validate functional security 
requirements, we propose an approach to develop acceptance tests from misuse cases. 
The approach proposed in this thesis provides a systematic method to develop a 
comprehensive set of executable security acceptance tests using artifacts already 
available during the requirements phase. The artifacts used are a misuse case model and a 
domain model. The proposed approach uses these artifacts to perform security robustness 
analysis to develop security robustness diagrams. It is important to note that our proposed 
approach is not intended to replace or improve upon any other approaches that develop 
4acceptance tests. In fact, we recommend using our approach in parallel with other 
requirements validation techniques.
1.2 A Brief Introduction to Misuse Case Modeling
The misuse case modeling technique was introduced by Sindre and Opdahl in 2000 
[Sindre] as an extension to use case modeling. This extension was proposed since the use 
case modeling notation and its semantics do not support the elicitation and modeling of 
functional security requirements. The misuse case modeling notation and its semantics 
were purposely designed with great resemblance to the use case modeling notation. The 
main contribution of misuse case modeling is the introduction of two new concepts; 
namely misuse cases and misusers. The notation and semantics of misuse cases and 
misusers are in line with the definition of use cases and actors, respectively. Misuse cases 
and misusers are formally defined in [Sindre] as follows:
Misuse Case: “A Sequence of actions, including variants, that a system or 
other entity can perform, interacting with misusers of the entity and 
causing harm to some stakeholder if the sequence is allowed to complete”.
[Sindre]
Misuser: “An actor that initiates misuse cases, either intentionally or 
inadvertently”. [Sindre]
Misuse cases may share the same relationships between them as do use cases; namely the 
include, extend and generalization relationships. Misusers may only share a 
generalization relationship between them as do actors. Misuse cases and misusers are 
5depicted as ovals and stickman figures, respectively, to signify their semantic 
resemblance to use cases and actors. However, misuse cases and misusers are depicted 
with inverted colors to signify that they are the inverse of use cases and actors, 
respectively. Misusers are linked with misuse cases using only the association 
relationship, which is also the only relationship that can exist between actors and use 
cases. Misuse case modeling introduces two new relationships; the threatensand
mitigates relationships. A threatens relationship may only be directed from misuse cases 
to use cases. The threatensrelationship states that the given misuse case threatens the 
security of the system when the given use case is being performed. The 
mitigatesrelationship may only be directed from use cases to misuse cases. The mitigates 
relationship states that the given use case is performed to mitigate against the threat posed 
by the given misuse case [Sindre].
Misuse cases depicted in the diagram are supplemented with textual descriptions. The 
textual descriptions explain in detail the threatening behavior of each misuse case. There 
are various templates proposed to describe misuse cases [Sindre-b, Sindre-c]. The 
proposed templates are often based on popular use case templates such as in [Cockburn, 
Kroll, Kulak]. The behavior is therefore described at the interaction level between the 
underlying system and other entities external to it. The actual behavior of each use case 
and misuse case is obtained from the textual descriptions while the diagram acts as a 
visual summary to all entities involved. Figure1 shows an example of a misuse case 
diagram.
6Figure 1A misuse case diagram example
The misuse case diagram shown in Figure 1 is concerned with a restaurant search feature 
available to customers. The feature is described by the “Search Restaurants” use case. A 
crook restaurant owner intercepts the search request and manipulates the results, as 
modeled by the “Manipulate Results” misuse case, most likely to promote their own 
restaurant unfairly. To defend against this threat, a new use case named “Encrypt Data” is 
introduced to mitigate the “Manipulate Results” misuse case by encrypting the search 
request. 
1.3 A Brief Introduction to Use Case Modeling
Usecases wereintroducedby Jacobson (Jacobsonet al., 1992) [Jacobson].A use case 
describes the communications between outside actors and the system in order to realize 
the user’s goal [Sindre-c]. “An actor might be a person, a company or organization, a 
computer program, or computer system hardware, software, or both.”[Cockburn]. As we 
know, use cases can be used as famous techniquefor communicating, eliciting, and 
documentingrequirements. Use cases can be used to express functional requirements of 
7the system, but theygive less expression for dealing with extra functional requirements, 
such as security requirements [Cockburn, Sindre-c, Rosenberg, Schneider, 
Holopainen,Mattingly]. Use cases, by their nature, focus on what the system should 
provide, and have less to describe what the system should not provide.
A use case in general illustrates functions of the system that should be able to execute. 
There are two types ofrelationship between use casesincludeand extend relationship. 
Include relationship is a type of relation between two use cases such that the base use 
case will contain the functionality for another use case.Extend relationship is a type of 
relation between two use cases such that use case will extendthe behavior of base use 
case[Cockburn,Sindre-c, Rosenberg,Rumbaugh].
1.4 A Brief Introduction to Acceptance Tests
“Developers write unit tests to determine if their code is doing things right. Customers 
write acceptance tests to determine if the system is doing the right things.”[Miller]
Acceptance test term was introduced by Kent Beck in his book test-driven development 
by example [Beck]. Acceptance testing can be considered as a type of test, conducted to 
check if the requirements specification of the system met the customer’s expectations. 
Acceptance testing evaluates the system under test with end user requirements [El-Attar, 
Briand, Beck]. The team development can use acceptance testing as a validation process 
to ensure that the functions of the system under test as planned; while system testing can 
be used as a verification process to guarantee that they will be creating the right system 
that will satisfy the end user requirements. Acceptance test is similar to system test in 
case of they are testing the whole system as the black box. System test and acceptance 
8test do not need to know the underlying code of the system. However, system testing and 
acceptance test remain separate processes [El-Attar, Beck].
Testing in agile software development [El-Attar] is primarily key as it allows reflectivity 
andImproves communication between developers. Acceptance tests express the 
customer’s needs. The acceptance tests can be used to give the customer self-assurance 
that the application has the essential features and that they perform correctly. In general 
we consider the project is ready or done when it passes all the acceptance 
tests.Acceptance tests can be considered as a “contract” between the developers and the 
customer. Preserving those tests, executing themregularly, and manipulating them as 
requirements modification,proves that there has been no break of contract [Rogers].
The benefits of a software development team from acceptance tests as the followings:
1. Acceptance testsare used to capture user requirements in a rightsupportable way, and 
they measure how well thesystem meets those requirements.
2. They uncover problems that unit tests omission.
3. They offer an off-the-shelf description of how “done”the system is.
As we know that recognizing user requirements is serious to the achievement of a project. 
If your system doesn’t ensure whatusers need, it might be officially stylish but basically 
worthless. The difficult is in supposing, as severalapproaches do, that in-depth 
specifications will benefit.
9There is solid evidence for the clue that extensive requirements specifications are 
unmanageable. Even if exhaustivespecifications were possible, they do not assurance that 
your system will do what users need [Miller,Mugridge].
Acceptance tests focus on both issues. First, acceptance tests can develop as the system 
develops, capturing user requirements as they evolve. Second, acceptance tests can be 
authorized directly – if a test passes, the system achieves the user requirements [Rogers].
1.4.1 Challenges in acceptance testing:
Acceptance testing looks very simple, but it can be a difficult to do it correct. The main 
topics to report are who writes tests, when they write tests, when tests are execute, and 
how to track tests.
Who writes the tests?
The business side of the project must be responsible ofwriting tests, or collaborate with 
the progress team to write them. The “business side” of the project might be the 
customer, other fellows of the customer’s association (such as QApersonnel, business 
analysts, etc.), or mixture of the two. The extreme programming(XP) customer eventually 
is in charge of creating the tests are written, nevertheless of who writes them. Business 
people must be able to write test in a language that they know. This language can be used
to describe things that make the client or customer satisfied[Crispin,Miller,Mugridge].
When to write the tests
Business people must write acceptance tests before designers have completely 
implemented code for the properties being tested. Usingthese requirements in this directly 
will help to reduce miscommunication between the client and the development team. It 
also helps save the design easy, greatly as writing unit tests before writing source code. 
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The development team must transcribe just sufficient code to acquire the property to pass. 
It is essential for business people to transcribe tests before the “final product” is done, but 
they must not write them too primarily [Crispin, Miller]. 
When to run the tests
Tests must be able to execute mechanically at a configurable regularity, and by hand as 
desired. Once the tests havebeen written, the team mustexecute them regularly. This must
develop as much as portion of the team’s developmentregularity as executing unit tests is
[Crispin, Miller].
Tracking the test
The teammust track on the everyday the total amount of acceptance tests written, and the 
amount that pass. Tracking percentages can vague certainty. For example If the squad 
had 200 tests yesterday and 40succeeded, nonetheless they have 210 now and 37succeed
was today poorer than yesterday? No, but 20% of the tests succeed yesterday and 17.61% 
succeed today, basically since you had further tests. Tracking numbers can be used to 
defeat this problem[Crispin, Miller].
1.4.2 Process to create acceptance test
Acceptance test processed as follows:
1. The client writes stories.
2. The development squad and the client havediscussions about the story to flesh out the 
aspectsand build a common understanding.
3. The developer does specific investigation to understand the story better, if the 
acceptance test is not pure. This is an effectivedevelopment action, and the “deliverable” 
does nothave to be authorized by an acceptance test.
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4. When the investigation is done, the developer writes a “first view” at one or more 
acceptance tests for thestory and authorizes it with the client. In this case, client
hassufficient evidence to guess the conclusion of theremains of the story.
5. After the client and the designer have granted on the "first cut" acceptance test(s), he 
gives them overto business people to transcribe more tests to discover all border 
conditions[Rogers]
1.4.3 Relationship between Acceptance Tests and Other Kinds of Test
As we know, writing acceptance tests is typically easier than writing unit test or
integration tests.This is because of the evidence that acceptance tests are transcribed, or at 
least want to be understood, by clients themselves. An automated acceptance test 
structure is possibly more difficult than that of aunit test driver, but from the test writer's 
point of view, things are preserved easy. When we compare the acceptance testing with 
unit and integration testing this provides us a better appearance on where acceptance 
testing fits the huge image. Unit tests commonly can be considered the tiniest scope in a 
project tests: unit test can be expressed the functional of a particular class, or extra minor 
unit in a software system. While acceptance tests are typically transcribed in a custom, 
area specific language that's simple forthe client to understand, unit tests are normally 
written in the executionlanguage of the software system[Rogers].
There are a few variances in the running of unit tests against acceptance tests. For 
instance, it is acceptable for an acceptance test to be unsuccessful until the story for 
which it was transcribed is applied. Unit tests, on the other side, must always success 
once integrated into the system. A great variance can also be detected in the fact that unit 
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tests are execute in separation, while acceptance tests have noticeable side effects. The
separation of unit tests guarantee that a deteriorating unit tests shouldn'tinfluence other 
unit tests, while a deteriorating acceptance testmight cause others to deteriorate. 
Integration tests are distant to acceptance tests in that they utilize on an abstract level than 
unit tests and validate the conduct of several portions of the system utilizing together. 
The major different between acceptance testing and integrationa test is that integration 
test can be considered as a part of the system. As well as integration tests are firmly 
developer-tests, and written in the natural language ofthe application [Rogers].
1.4.4 Tools for Automating Acceptance Test
Acceptance tests incorporateat anabstract level between the business logic and theuser 
interface or openly with the user interface. Doingacceptance testing by hand will in most 
cases beboring, costly and time consuming. Automation of acceptance tests might appear 
as a talented creativity to simple and enhance this process. The key knowledge of 
automated acceptance test (AAT) is to certificate requirements and needed outcome in a 
design that can be inevitably and continually tested. In order to catch the extreme 
advantage from the tests, we need tools to mechanize the real implementation of the tests.
There are several of tools that used to create automated acceptance tests [Miller].  These 
tools will be explained in more detail in the following:
1.4.4.1 Fit and the Table –Based Technique 
As we know that acceptance tests are design to test the project’s performance from the 
client's standpoint, it must be conceivable for the client to write the tests themselves and 
recognize the test specification without need for prior understanding on 
programmingLanguages.Maybe the greatest famous execution of a table-based 
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acceptance testingtool is Fit (Framework for Integrated Test), introduced by Ward 
Cunningham in 2002. [WP-FIT]. It is an open-source tool that permits clients to offer 
example of their application must work by writing them in a table layout.In Fit's 
situation, the tests are shown as normal HTML tables: the clients are welcome to usage 
any tool (for instance a word processor) for building the tables, as long as the figures can 
be transferred to HTML. 
In Fit, this converting is completed by fixtures transcribed by programmers, maximum 
often in the real execution language of the application. A fixture is used to read the 
information from a table, and checks the application by utilizing the data as the input
[Mugridge].
To end with, the fixture runner matches the client-set needs with the real outcomes and 
reports any faults bycolor-coding the table rows: red for failures, green for passed 
tests.The Fit framework is accessible for a several of different programming languages, 
for instance Java, .NET, Python, Smalltalk and C++.It must be mentioned that Fit 
produces specifying the test standard to be easy for non-technical people, there's a call for
programmers when applying Fit: the converting of a specification table to the real 
application needs programmer interference. Fit-based tests are implemented by a 
command-line tool that takes only one HTMLfile as its input. For an extra scattered 
method to useFit, there is a toolnamed FitNesse. Fundamentally, FitNessedepends on the 
Fit, but puts the test specifications on a website from which the tests can really be 
performed via the press of a button. FitNesse is applied as a Wiki, which means the web 
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pagescan be easily manipulatedvia the squad members without any precise tools other
thana web browser[Mugridge].
1.4.4.2 Selenium and Web-Based Acceptance Testing
Fit and FitNesse, explainedabove, are acceptance testing toolsthat can be applied on any 
part of software: instead of executing inevitablyin contrast to some pre-defined interface, 
Fit tests should be converted to the objectivesystem case-by-case by using fixtures. By 
nature, these fixtures are connected tothe inner structures of the software under test, and 
while they don't work onthe class level such as unit tests do, for instance, the fixtures 
must recognize a lotabout the execution of system [Mugridge, Selenium].
In actual fact, Selenium tracks the same approach for identifying test cases as Fit: tests 
are well-defined in tables in an HTML page. Test outcomes are also visualized in the 
same methodas in Fit, by coloring the table rows depending on their outcome.The key 
variance between Selenium and a pure Fit-based method is that Selenium is restrict to the 
domain of web-based applications. Accordingly, Selenium is not auniversal intend tool 
for acceptance testing. The real execution of Seleniumis naturally simple: instead of 
demanding a server-side platform for running tests, the principal of Selenium is depend 
on a little HTML and JavaScript files that arelocated on the server on which the 
application under test exist in.
The customer-written HTML pages that cover the tests are also positioned on the server, 
and reaching these static HTML files byusing internet browser opens a user interface 
through which the tests can be performed. The test implementation happens completely 
inside the user's browser, with the tests calling for several pages from the originating 
server. According to the fact that Selenium can only be applied for testing web-based 
applications,it shows up with a group of prior commands that can be used to regulate the 
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running of the tests. Nowadays, Selenium can be used for all the main internet browsers 
on all main operating systems [Selenium].
1.5 A Brief Introduction to Security Robustness Analysis
Security robustness analysis was introduced in earlier work [El-Attar Robustness]. 
Security robustness analysis is an extension to the robustness analysis technique 
[Rosenberg – Use case Driven]. Robustness analysis has a dual purpose: (a) it is used to 
complete and remove inconsistencies between the use case and domain models, thus 
making them more robust, and (b) its outcome is a robustness diagram which take a first-
cut guess at the objects required to realize scenarios described in use cases, thus reducing 
the gap between the analysis and design phases. The source of the objects used are either 
the domain model or they are introduced by the modeler. In case objects are introduced 
by the modelers, these objects are then added to the domain modeling, making it more 
complete. 
It is important to note that robustness analysis is not intended to yield a final design 
although the robustness diagrams produced can be refined into a final design if the design 
team wishes to do so. The main purpose of robustness analysis is to brainstorm and 
explore different solutions to the problem domain without committing to any particular 
design prematurely and becoming overly concerned with design details and conforming 
to a wide variety of syntax rules. Therefore, the robustness diagrams modeling notation is 
purposely designed to be very relatively very simply. The notational set contains four 
main entities which are presented and briefly explained in Table 2 in chapter 3. Any two 
entities can be linked together using a solid line to loosely state that they are involved.
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The robustness analysis technique is only applicable to regular use cases and it only 
models regular business-related functional behavior. The notational set of robustness 
diagrams therefore does not support the modeling of security aspects, such as those 
described in a misuse case. To overcome this drawback, security robustness analysis was 
introduced as an extension to robustness diagrams [El-Attar SEKE]. Security robustness 
analysis yields security robustness diagrams which introduce two new sets of objects that 
share similar notation to robustness diagrams ( seeTable 2 in chapter 3). The first set of 
objects is used to model the realization of misuse and threatening behavior as described 
in a misuse case (see Table 3rightin chapter 3). This set of objects is coloured black to 
symbolize their negation property. The second set of objects is used to model the 
realization of the mitigation behavior as described by a use case the mitigatesa misuse 
case (see Table 3leftin chapter), which are coloured green. This second set of objects was 
introduced since it is important to make the distinction between objects representing 
business-related behavior and objects that were introduced to mitigate against threats.
1.6 Domain Model
Domain model can be described as technique used to represent the concepts of problem 
domain. It can be used to connect the objects in the system domain to each other. These
objects can be classified into two things, physical objectsand entity objects. It explains 
the different entities, correlations, their features, roles, and constraints that manage the 
problem domain [1].
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Theessential gain of a domain model is that it illustrates and limits the scope of the 
problem domain. The domain model can be efficiently applied to confirm and evaluate 
the recognizing of the problem domain among a variety of stakeholders
1.7 Problem Statement
There are several proposed methods that dependon generating test cases from different 
analysisartifacts, such as utilize, sequencediagram, class diagram, use case models, and 
activity diagram[1,2,19,20,21]. However, none of these approaches attempt to generate 
the securityacceptance testsin the early stage as a validation process of functional security 
requirements by utilizing misuse case model and security robustness diagram. This work 
willintroduce a novel technique to develop executable security acceptance test in the 
early stage from misuse case model and security robustness diagram.
1.8 Thesis Objectives
The major objective of this work is to introduce a new and simple technique to develop 
security acceptance tests in the early stage as a validation process of functional security 
requirements by utilizing misuse case model and security robustness diagram. In order to 
carry out this objective the following tasks will be executed.
1. Extensive survey of generating acceptance test form various artifacts will be 
performed.
2. A novel and simple method for creating security acceptance test from misuse 
model case and security robustness analysis will be introduced. 
3. The proposed technique will be illustrated by casestudy.
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4. The case study result will be investigated and the conclusion and future work in 
this field will be introduced.
1.9 Thesis Methodology
Our research methodology consists of the following phases:
Phase 1: Literature Review
In this phase, we will study the existing approaches which are used for generating 
acceptance tests from use cases and various artifacts.
Phase 2: To propose a new Approach
In this phase, we will propose a novel technique for generating executable security 
acceptance tests in the early stage validation of functional security requirements by 
utilizing misuse case and security robustness analysis.
Phase 3: Case Studies for Proposed Approach
In this phase, we will use case study to illustrate and investigate our proposed 
Methodology
Phase 4: Conclusions
The conclusions of the research and future workswill be presented. 
Phase 5: Thesis Writing 
Complete the thesis write-up.
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1.10 Thesis Outline
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents related work 
ongenerating the acceptance tests from use case. Chapter 3 presents a methodology that 
will yield executable securityacceptance tests to validate functional security requirements 
stated in misuse case models. Chapter 4 presents theFaculty Search Committee system 
case study to demonstrate how the proposed approach can be used to produce security 
acceptance tests using a misuse case model and its robustness diagrams. Chapter 
5concludes the thesis and discusses future work.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
There are several proposals which deal with problem of generating the acceptance tests 
from use case. In this section, we look back on work related to this issue.
2.1 Exploiting Use Cases to Derive Acceptance Tests
A number of research works have proposed various methods to develop tests based on 
use case descriptions [Ryser, Nebut, Briand, Basanieri]. Unlike the approach proposed in 
this thesis which produces acceptance tests, the type of tests created in these works are 
system tests [Ryser, Nebut, Briand, Basanieri]. System testing is an essential component 
of the overall verification and validation effort as stated in the V-Model. However, there 
are differences between acceptance and system testing and thus neither can substitute for 
the other. As a prelude to comparing our approach with the other works, the distinction
between acceptance and system testing is identified. Table 1 compares acceptance and 
system testing with respect to their purpose and their intended users.
Table 1Acceptance Testing vs. System Testing
Acceptance Testing System Testing
What
and 
When?
Prior to development:
Acceptance test development is a validation 
System testing is a 
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process in whereby the tests are created and 
their results dry-run for the purpose of 
ensuring that the “correct” system will be 
built. There is multitude of sources for 
acceptance tests. In large-scale projects, tests 
are commonly derived from use cases and 
domain models.
verificationprocess the 
exercises the system to 
determine if it actually 
produces the expected results 
based on given input. System 
testing is performed before 
delivery to observe the system 
behavior as a whole and to 
detect and fix bugs. System 
testing is therefore conducted 
only after the SUT (System 
Under Test) has been 
developed. System tests are 
usually derived from 
acceptance tests and other 
system design artifacts.
After development:
Acceptance testing here is a verification 
process used to show the customer that the 
system satisfies the agreed upon 
requirements. Acceptance testing is used to 
determine that the software developed is 
properly operating on-site. Moreover, it is 
used as checklist and a basis for contract 
satisfaction.
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Who?
Customers, end-users and business analysts 
(or requirements engineers) ideally will 
collaborate during the requirements 
engineering phase to create user acceptance 
tests.Customers and end-users is a crucial 
aspect since they possess valuable about the 
problem domain and the required 
functionalities. Business analysts apply 
analytical techniques to derive tests to 
determine if the requirements are complete, 
consistent and correct.
Software developers will 
ideally create system tests to 
guide their development 
activities. Software testers will 
use the developed system tests 
to check for bugs.
The purpose and properties of acceptance testing, as outlined in Table 1, suggests that 
any technique aimed at developing acceptance tests should ideally satisfy the following 
criteria:
Criteria-1. Low technical difficulty to be used by customers and business 
analysts (BAs) as they will be highly involved.
Criteria-2. Applicable in the early phases of the development lifecycle to 
be useful for validation
Criteria-3. Bridges the gap between the analysis and design phases
Criteria-4. Produces executable tests
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Criteria-5. Produces reusable tests Produces tests that validate and verify 
functional security requirement
The TOTEM methodology utilizes various analysis artifacts, such as use case models, 
sequence, collaboration and class diagrams to develop test cases [Briand].  Sequence, 
collaboration and class diagrams are usually unavailable until after the completion of the 
design phase (criteria-2). The TOTEM methodology prescribes that analysis artifacts 
need to be heavily augmented with OCL (Object Constraint Language) expressions. The 
technique introduced in [Nebut] was also based on extending use cases with contracts to 
facilitate test case generation. It is safe to assume that learning and using OCL effectively 
is an advanced skill beyond that can be expected from a customer or a BA (criteria-
1).According to the duties and skills set of BAs outlined by BABOK (Business Analysts 
Body of Knowledge) [BABOK], which is a well-recognized official reference used by 
BAs to attain their BA certification, it can be deduced that a BA cannot be expected to 
perform any activities that can be considered technically highly complex. In [Ryser], an 
approach named the SCENT-Method was introduced. The SCENT-Method is concerned 
with systematically constructingstatecharts from use case scenarios. The statecharts are 
detailed with pre and postconditions, data ranges, data values and non-functional 
requirements. Users of the SCENT-Method need to crosscheck the statechartsfor any 
inconsistencies, incorrectness and incompleteness. Once again, this approach is 
technically too demanding to be performed effectively by a customer or a BA (criteria-1). 
According to BABOK, the skill set required by the approach presented in this thesis
should be possessed by BAs (criteria-1) [BABOK]. The only exception is the skill of 
performing robustness analysis. However, in previous work [El-Attar-b], it was 
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empirically validated that BAs can effectively perform robustness analysis using a small 
learning curve and without the need for in-depth knowledge of object-oriented concepts. 
None of the previously mentioned approaches produce executable acceptance tests 
(criteria-4), which in turn hinders their reusability of the tests created (criteria-5). The 
approach presented in [Basanieri] can be used to derive executable test cases from UML 
diagrams. The limitation of this approach is that it requires detailed sequence and 
communication diagrams to be available. These are detail design artifacts that are ideally 
expected to be constructed and communicated by system designers not customers and 
BAs (criteria-13). Therefore the requirements of the approach presented in [Basanieri] 
prevent it from being performed during the early phases of the development process 
(criteria-2). An approach developed in previous work [El-Attar] satisfies criteria-15, 
but not criteria-6. The approach presented in this thesis was specifically designed to 
account for functional security requirements, in addition to satisfyingcriteria-15. There 
are important characteristics about the approach presented in this thesis which 
differentiates it from the approach in [El-Attar]. Firstly, the approach presented in [El-
Attar] only considered use cases, not misuse cases. Although misuse cases are 
semantically similar to use cases, their execution interferes with the execution of a use 
case. This means that misuse cases are performed in parallel with use cases. Misuse case 
behavior does not simply plug-in to the behavior of a use case as is the case of a function 
calling another function. In fact, this characteristic of misuse case modeling motivated the 
development of mal-activity diagrams in order to model and communicate misuse 
behavior more accurately [Sindre-d]. The behavioral characteristics of misuse cases 
significantly compound their analysis which is required to produce acceptance tests. 
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Secondly, the approach presented in [El-Attar] does not account for relationships between 
use cases such as the includeand extend relationship. The approach presented in this 
thesis accounts for such relationships, in addition to relationships between misuse cases 
and use cases, namely the threatens and mitigates relationship.
THE PROPOSED METHALOD
In this section we will explain the proposed methodology that will yield executable 
security acceptance tests to validate functional security requirements stated in misuse 
case models. The proposed methodology consists of three mai
are briefly described below and an overview of the overall methodology is shown in 
Figure2. The main phases are described in greater detail in sections 
Phase 1: Develop security acceptance tests at a high
interrelated use and misuse cases (Figure 
interrelated when they form a web of associations that consists of a usage case; behavior 
that threatens the system when performing this usage case; and mitigation behavior. The 
high-level security acceptance tests (HLSATs) are used to draw quick feedback from 
stakeholders to validate the functional security requirement. The other purpose of the 
high-level security acceptance tests to determine the necessary inputs or triggers of the 
use and misuse cases.
Domain 
Model
Misuse Case 
Model
Security 
Robustness 
Diagrams
Figure 2An overview of the proposed methodology
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CHAPTER 3
GY
n phases. The main phases 
3.1-3
-level based on each set of 
2). Use and misuse cases are considered 
(Phase 1) 
Develop high level security 
acceptance tests (HLSATs)
(Phase 2) 
Perform security 
robustness analysis
(Phase 3) 
Develop executable  
security acceptance tests 
(ESATs)
High Level Security 
Acceptance Tests (HLATs)
Executable Security 
Acceptance Tests (ESATs)
.3.
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Phase 2: Perform security robustness analysis to create and utilize objects that realizes 
the behavior of the use and misuse cases. A separate security robustness diagram will be 
created to model the objects representing a set of interrelated use and misuse cases.
Phase 3: For each security robustness diagram, its object level information is used to 
realize the high-level security acceptance tests previously developed in phase 1 by 
transforming them into an executable form.
3.1 Phase 1: Developing high-level security acceptance tests
The narratives of use and misuse cases are used as basis for developing informal and 
abstract level descriptions of security acceptance tests (HLSATs). HLSATs are 
developed to disconnect the process of identifying acceptance tests from any technical 
details such as that concerned with the syntax of a programming language. As such the 
user of the proposed technique will be able to focus on determining the essential set of 
acceptance tests without being distracted by syntactical details. HLSATs are developed 
by determining sets of use cases, misuse cases that threatens them and their mitigation 
use cases. For each set, their narratives are analyzed to systematically create the 
necessary acceptance tests. The acceptance tests developed should cover the various 
usage scenarios. As is the case with any type of test, acceptance tests are comprised of 
inputs and expected outputs. Input can be in the form of data or a series of functional 
calls. Tests are evaluated by checking the system’s resulting output or final state. In order 
to determine this essential information, the user of the proposed technique asks three key 
questions:
Question 1: What are the usage scenarios that span the set of use cases, their misuse 
cases and their mitigation use cases?
Usage scenarios are not confined to just one mis/use case. Misuse scenarios and the 
counter mitigation behavior are described across a pattern of mis/use cases. The pattern 
includes ordinary use cases that contain business-related behavior, misuse cases that 
execute harmful behavior, and mitigation use cases that describes the behavior necessary 
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to mitigate the threatening behavior. Ideally, the threatened use case will include the 
mitigation use case to call upon its mitigation behavior. This pattern is shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3 Usage patterns in misuse case models
Question 2: What are the input data or actions that triggers and perform the usage 
scenario?
Upon identifying the usage scenarios from Q1, it is required to identify the needed inputs, 
triggers and pre-conditions. Inputs and triggers are usually provided by actors, misusers, 
use cases, misuse cases or other systems. The pre-conditions are used to determine the 
requisite system state to establish the proper testing environment. This essential 
information can be obtained by examining the textual descriptions of mis/use cases, 
actors, misusers and the domain model. Ideally, the required information should be 
available within the textual descriptions of the mis/use cases, otherwise the descriptions 
are likely incomplete. Input can be provided throughout the execution of a scenario. 
Therefore, it is necessary to perform a step-by-step examination of the textual 
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descriptions in order to determine what input is needed and when it should be provided. 
The required data inputs should be identified within the classes of the domain model as 
attributes. Triggers should be identified within the classes of the domain model as 
operations.
Question 3: What are the expected output values (or system state) for each usage 
scenario?
The success criterion of a usage scenario is ideally evaluated by the output values the 
system produces or the system final state. Similar to Q2, output can be provided 
throughout the execution of a scenario. Therefore, it is necessary to perform a step-by-
step examination of the textual descriptions in order to determine what output is produced 
and when it will be produced. Evaluating the system final state is naturally performed 
upon the completion of the usage scenario. Similar to Q2, The output data should be 
within the classes of the domain model as attributes.
There may be cases where the above three questions are difficult to answer. This is 
usually symptomatic of a low quality misuse case model. Such misuse case models 
describe behavior that is ambiguous, too abstract or incomplete. Performing security 
robustness analysis (Phase 2) will attempt to remedy this problem and improve the 
quality of the misuse case model. However, if security robustness analysis fails then the 
misuse case model used is of very low quality and should be improved beforehand.
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3.2 Phase 2: Performing security robustness analysis
Security robustness analysis was introduced in earlier work [El-Attar-d]. Security 
robustness analysis is an extension to the robustness analysis technique [Rosenberg]. 
Robustness analysis has a dual purpose: (a) it is used to complete and remove 
inconsistencies between the use case and domain models and making them both more 
complete, thus making them more robust, and (b) its outcome is a robustness diagram 
which utilizes objects from the domain model required to realize scenarios described in 
use cases, thus reducing the gap between the analysis and design phases. The source of
the objects used are either the domain model or they are introduced by the modeler. In 
case of new objects being introduced during security robustness analysis, these objects 
are added to the domain modeling, making it more detailed.
It is important to note that robustness analysis is not intended to yield a final design 
although the robustness diagrams produced can be refined into a final design if the design 
team wishes to do so. The main purpose of robustness analysis is to brainstorm and 
explore different solutions to the problem domain without committing to any particular 
design prematurely and becoming overly concerned with design details and conforming 
to a wide variety of syntax rules. Therefore, the robustness diagrams modeling notation is 
purposely designed to be relatively very simply. The notational set contains four main 
constructs shown in Table 2. Any two entities can be linked together using a solid line to 
loosely state that they are associated.
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Table 2Robustness diagram objects
The robustness analysis technique is only applicable to regular use cases and it only 
models regular business-related functional behavior. The notational set of robustness 
diagrams therefore does not support the modeling of security aspects, such as those 
described in a misuse case. To overcome this drawback, security robustness analysis was 
introduced as an extension to robustness diagrams [El-Attar-d]. Security robustness 
analysis yields security robustness diagrams which introduce two new sets of objects that 
share similar notation to robustness diagrams (Table 2). The first set of objects is used to 
model the realization of misuse and threatening behavior as described in a misuse case 
(see Table 3right). This set of objects is colored black to symbolize their negation 
property, in-line with misuse cases. The second set of objects is used to model the 
realization of the mitigation behavior as described by a use case the mitigatesa misuse 
case (see Table 3left), which are colored green. This second set of objects was introduced 
Entity Symbol Concept
Actors Similar concept to an actor in use case diagrams.
Boundary
Actors communicate with the system using boundary 
objects.
Entity Similar concept to an entity in a conceptual model.
Control Undertakes logical tasks using boundary and entity objects.
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since it is important to make the distinction between objects representing business-related 
behavior and objects that were introduced to mitigate against threats.
The security robustness diagram is developed by analyzing the text of the relevant use 
and misuse cases. A set of objects are introduced based on the analysis of the text. The 
interactions between these objects are expected to realize “play-out” the behavior stated 
in the use and misuse cases. Analysis of the relevant use and misuse cases narrative 
should be performed in three phases. In the first phase, the narrative of the use case 
describing the ordinary business rules is analyzed and the set of regular objects and actors 
are created, using the notation shown in Table 2. Pre-existing objects in the domain 
model should be used to develop this initial diagram whenever possible. The first phase is 
concerned with developing an ordinary robustness diagram. In the second phase, the 
narrative of the misuse case describing the misuse behavior is analyzed and a set misuse 
objects and misusers are created (black graphical notation). Relevant misuse cases should 
be identified from the misuse case diagram. Relevant misuse cases are the ones that have 
a threatens relationship directed towards the given use case. When analyzing the text of 
the misuse cases, it is important to determine the points in the functional behavior of the 
regular use case where the misuse behavior is expected to happen. As such the robustness 
diagram initially developed is amended by adding the misuse objects and misusers within 
the flow of the regular objects and actors. At this point the robustness diagram only 
contains objects that realize the business rules, misuse objects, actors and misusers (all 
graphical entities at this point are either white or black). In the final phase, the narrative 
of the mitigating use cases is analyzed and a set of mitigation objects and actors are 
created (green graphical notation). Relevant mitigation use cases can be identified as the 
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ones that have a mitigates relationship directed towards misuse cases that have a 
threatens relationship directed towards to the original use case.
Table 3Extended notation of security robustness diagrams
Entity Symbol Entity Symbol
Mitigator Misuser
Mitigation 
Boundary
Misuse 
Boundary
Mitigation 
Control
Misuse Control
Mitigation Entity Misuse Entity
Figure 3 presents an example of a security robustness diagram. This security robustness 
diagram is constructed based on the analysis of the mis/use cases presented earlier in 
Figure 1. The security robustness diagram shown in Figure 4 illustrates how the crook 
restaurant owner is expected to threaten the integrity of the search results. The crook 
restaurant owner intercepts and reveals the search request from the customer. The crook 
restaurant owner then proceeds to store user preferences and execute the search himself. 
The crook restaurant owner then manipulates the results by removing some of their 
competitor’s restaurants from the search results and unfairly highlighting their own 
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restaurant. Mitigation efforts include data encryption of the search terms, double-
checking of the list of restaurants retrieved and the restoration of viewing defaults.
Figure 4 Example security robustness diagram
3.3 Phase 3: Developing Executable Security Acceptance Tests (ESATs)
This final phase leads to the ultimate goal of developing ESATs. For this phase, 
developers can use any automated framework to develop and execute the 
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securityacceptance tests. There exist many tools than provide automation support for this 
phase, such as FIT/FITnesse [Mugridge] and Selenium [Selenium]. Although our 
approach is independent of any implementation solution, we utilize the FIT/FITnesse 
syntax, since it is arguably the most commonly used framework for developing and 
executing acceptance tests. Using the FIT/FITnesse framework requires acceptance tests 
to be developed in a tabular form, known as fixtures. FIT/FITnesse provides three types 
of fixtures: (a) ActionFixture, (b) ColumnFixture, and (c) RowFixture. Each fixture type 
is used to develop different categories of test cases. An ActionFixture can be used to 
develop scenario based tests that includes multiple steps. ActionFixtures are especially 
useful in transaction-based functionalities where frequent interactions with a user are 
expected. The rows in an ActionFixtures are executed sequentially where each row 
(expect the fixture header) is considered an action. Each row consists of a numbers of 
fields. The first field of each row contains one of four commands that indicate the type of 
action to be performed. Table 4 provides a brief explanation of each command. The 
subsequent fields are used to include the necessary information to execute the 
command.Using the running example of the restaurant system, an ActionFixture example 
can be shown in Figure 5.
Table 4 Keywords used in ActionFixtures
Command Purpose
Start Starts the given application. It is useful to execute this command to ensure 
the initial state of the system.
Enter This command is used to create input. The following field contains the 
name of input to be entered, which is followed by another field containing 
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the actual data value
Press This command is used to execute functions in the given application. The 
following field contains the name of the function to be executed. Note that 
it is often the case that a function is executed by performing a GUI 
operation, such as a push of a button. 
Check The purpose of this command is to evaluate whether the output rendered 
by the application is the same as the expected output. The following field 
contains the name of the data to be evaluated, which is followed by 
another field containing the expected data value.
MapViewer
Enter MapViewer.CurrentCity Boston
Enter DisplayFilter.isSmoking False
Press MapViewer.displayMap()
Check MapViewer.isMapDisplayed True
Figure 5 Example ActionFixture
A RowFixture is used to check sets of data. The header of a RowFixture indicates the 
name of the data structure to be evaluated. The remaining rows include the expected data 
elements. ColumnFixtures are used for formula evaluations where input is provided to a 
function and its output is evaluated. ColumnFixtures are useful to evaluate functionalities 
that do not include user interactions. The header of a ColumnFixture contains the name of 
the function under test. The following row contains headers of data name columns. Input 
columns start from the left and are followed by output columns on the right. Figures 6 
and 7 show examples of a RowFixture and a ColumnFixture, respectively.
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MapViewer.Map.DisplayedRestaurants
Name Address Phone
China Pearl Restaurant 9 Tyler St, Boston, MA (617) 426-4338
Jacob Wirth 31 Stuart St, Boston, MA (617) 338-8586
Figure 6 Example RowFixure
MapViewer.RestaurantName
Date SmokingSection GroupSize Reservation()
30-4-2013 No 6 Confirmed
5-5-2013 Yes 2 Unavailable
Figure 7 Example ColumnFixture
3.4 Targeted Coverage by the Developed Acceptance Tests
The proposed approach aims to develop security acceptance tests for different usage 
scenarios based on the usage pattern shown in Figure 3. Therefore, the tests developed 
aims to achieve path coverage. As of the time of writing this thesis, there has not been 
any empirical evaluation conducted that provides evidence of a better test coverage 
criteria for mis/use cases. Therefore, path coverage was targeted as it was deemed the 
most appropriate given the scenario based characteristic of mis/use cases.
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CHAPTER 4
CASE STUDY
4.1 The Faculty Search Committee System Case Study
This section presents the Faculty Search Committee system case study to demonstrate 
how the proposed approach can be used to produce security acceptance tests using a 
misuse case model and its robustness diagrams. The Faculty Search Committee system 
was developed by professional developers at the IT department of King Fahd University 
of Petroleum and Minerals, Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. The purpose of the system is to 
facilitate the processes of receiving and reviewing applications for faculty openings at the 
Information and Computer Science (ICS) department. In general, the users of the system 
include any faculty member in the ICS department. However, the faculty search 
committee members are expected to be the most involved users with the system. The use 
cases of the system were derived by the development team and in consultation with the 
faculty search committee. The faculty search committee consists of three members 
(faculty members) in addition to a chairman. It should be noted that the chairman of the 
faculty search committee is the author of this thesis. The development team would apply 
the proposed technique to develop security acceptance tests in collaboration with the 
committee members. The committee members, as experts in the problem domain, would 
use the security acceptance tests to validate the intended security behavior of the system.
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The underlying workflow for the review process begins with the department secretary 
scanning and uploading hardcopies of applications onto the system. The system tags the 
application with an ID and sends notifications to the committee members. The three 
committee members then independently review the application and render their 
recommendation. Only after the three members submit their review, the system notifies 
the committee chairman to review the application and also study the input from the 
committee members. The chairman then renders his decision based on his independent 
review of the application and the input from the other members. The chairman’s decision 
is treated as the committee’s decision. The decision is then forwarded to the department 
chairman for perusal.
The system offers some features (use cases) to facilitate the underlying workflow. The 
most basic feature is the ability of its users to view and review applications. The system 
allows its users to change their rendered decision or review of an application. The system 
also allows its users to redirect an application to another faculty member if deemed 
necessary. Based on the initial set of use cases, misuse cases were accordingly identified 
and the use case model evolved into a misuse case model. Misuse cases include improper 
change of decision or a review; improper removal of an application; and improper 
redirection of an application to another department. Consequently, a new set of use
cases were added to the misuse case model to fend against misuse of the system. The 
final misuse case model of the system is shown in Figure 8. The misuse case model 
contains 2 actors, 1 misuser, 6 use cases and 3 misuse cases. A brief description of each 
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element in the model is provided in Table 5. The preliminary domain model of the 
Faculty Search Committee system is presented in Figure 9. The domain model is usually 
built through a brainstorming process. Table 6 provides a brief description of the classes 
contained in the preliminary domain model.
Figure 8 Misuse case model of the faculty search committee system
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Table 5 Properties of the faculty search committee system misuse case model
Element Purpose
Actors
Faculty Search 
Committee 
Member
A faculty search committee member is a licit user of the system. A 
faculty search member uses the system to mainly review applications 
and render decisions. A faculty search committee member may also 
redirect an application to another faculty member if deemed 
appropriate.
Faculty Search 
Committee 
Chairman
The faculty search committee chairman is a special type of faculty 
search committee member. He has additional privileges in 
comparison with regular faculty search committee members. The 
chairman can review changes in an application decision and requests 
for application redirects. The chairman has the power to cancel any 
changes if deemed appropriate.
Misusers
Malicious 
Application
This is the sole misuser. A malicious applicant is a person who 
attempts to misuse the system to gain an unfair advantage for the 
application review process of a particular applicant. This can be 
done by redirecting application reviews, changing decisions and 
removing competing applications. 
Use Cases
View This use case describes the necessary behavior to view all active 
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Applications applications.
Review 
Application
This use case is an extension to the “View Applications” use case. It 
describes the behavior of an application being reviewed by a faculty 
search committee member which culminates with a rendering of a 
decision.
Redirect Review
This use case is also an extension of the “View Applications” use 
case. It describes the behavior of an application being redirected by a 
faculty search committee member. Redirection requires the 
nomination of another faculty member to conduct the review.
Send Email of 
Review or 
Decision Change 
to Chairman
This is a mitigation use case whose purpose is to notify the chairman 
of any decision or review changes with respect to a particular 
application. This use case mitigates against the threat of illegally 
changing the decision or review of a particular application.
Create List of 
Removed 
Application
This is a mitigation use case whose purpose is to display the list of 
removed application. This use case mitigates against the threat of 
unfairly removing a competitive application.
Send Email of 
Redirect to 
Chairman
This is a mitigation use case whose purpose is to notify the chairman 
of an application review redirect. This use case mitigates against the 
threat of bias selection of an application referee.
Misuse Cases
Change Review This misuse case describes the behavior initiated by a malicious 
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or Decision 
Illegally
application to illegally change the review or decision of a particular 
application.
Remove 
Application
This misuse case describes the behavior initiated by a malicious 
application to unfairly remove a competitive application.
Redirect Review 
Illegally
This misuse case describes the behavior initiated by a malicious 
application to illegally redirect an application to a faculty member 
whom more likely to conduct a favorable review.
Figure 9The initial domain model of the system
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Table 6 A brief explanation of the domain models classes
Class Purpose
Application Viewer This is the main interface to the system.
Applicant List Contains the list of all applications 
including removed applications.
Removed Application List Contains a list of applications that have 
been removed.
Application An application for employment by an 
applicant.
Users Registered user list containing faculty 
members
User A particular registered user of the system.
Current User The current logged user in the system.
Current Application A current application retrieved from the 
application list for viewing.
The following subsections will demonstrate the application of the proposed technique to 
develop security acceptances tests based on the developed use/misuse cases. The aim of 
applying the proposed technique is to create a set of executable security acceptance tests 
that will cover misusage scenarios described by the three misuse cases. The following is 
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an outline of the analysis performed to produce security acceptance testing for this case 
study:
Sections 4.1.1: The behavior of the “Remove Application Illegally” misuse case and its 
associated use cases is presented. This behavior is analyzed in the proceeding 
subsections.
(Phase 1):A set of HLSATs is created to simulate the misusage behavior and test the 
mitigation behavior.
(Phase 2):Security robustness analysis is performed and a correspondingsecurity 
robustness diagram is created. Security robustness analysis identifies classes that 
correspond to the inputs and outputs stated in the HLSATs.
(Phase 3): The identified classes are used to create ESATs to that implement the 
HSLATs. 
Sections 4.1.2 and 4.1.3 follow a similar structure to that of Section 4.1.1 to analyze 
misuse cases “Change Review Decision Illegally” and “Redirect Review Illegally”, 
respectively.
4.1.1 Remove Application – Misuse Case
This misuse case is initiated by a malicious applicantby providing a username that does 
not belong to them (unless the misuser is an insider). The system then displays the list of 
active applications. The malicious applicant then provides the name or ID of a particular 
application which is then retrieved and displayed by the “Application Viewer”. The 
malicious applicant then executes a remove function to remove that retrieved application. 
The expected mitigation behavior is then triggered by the system by adding the removed 
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application to a list removed applications. The list contains the removed applications in 
addition to the users who executed the remove function.
Applying the proposed technique begins by examining the behavior of the involved 
mis/use cases. A separate HLSAT should be created for each flow between the flattened 
mis/use cases (Phase 1). For brevity and simplicity purposes, only the “basic flow” of all 
mis/use cases will be considered. The following HLSAT was derived based on the 
behavior of the involved mis/use cases (see Table 7).
Table 7 The HLSAT for the “Remove Application” misuse case
Test ID Description Expected Results
Remove Application-
Basic Flow
Precondition: Run Faculty 
Search Committee System
Input: Username
Input: Password
Input: ID of application to be 
removed
Output: The selected 
application is removed but 
added to the list of removed 
applications displayed by the 
“Application Viewer”
In the next phase, a security robustness diagram is developed (see Figure 10) by utilizing 
classes already present in the initial domain model (Phase 2). New objects are also 
introduced as necessary as a result of performing security robustness analysis. The 
behavior of the involved mis/use cases can be modeled by the security robustness 
diagram shown in Figure 10.
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Figure 10The security robustness diagram for the “Remove Application” misuse case
The final phase is concerned with developing ESATs(Phase 3). In this phase executable 
tests are created to realize the HLSATs previously developed (Table 8). The executable 
tests make use of the objects present in the corresponding security robustness diagrams 
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(Figure 11). The ESAT shown below consists of six fixtures. Table 8 provides a brief 
description of the type and purpose of each fixture
ApplicationViewer
Enter Users.CurrentUser Username
Enter Users.CurrentUser Password
Press ApplicationViewer.DisplayActiveApplications()
Check ApplicationViewer.isDisplayActiveApplicat
ions()
True
ApplicationViewer.ApplicationList.DisplayedApplications
Application-1
Application-2
Application-3
ApplicationViewer
Enter ApplicationViewer.CurrentApplication Application-1
Press ApplicationViewer.Remove()
ApplicationViewer.ApplicationList.DisplayedApplications
Application-2
Application-3
ApplicationViewer
Check ApplicationViewer.CurrentApplication Application
Press ApplicationViewer.DisplayRemovedApplications()
Check ApplicationViewer.isDisplayRemovedApplications() True
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ApplicationViewer.RemovedApplicationList.DisplayedApplications
Application-1 Username
Figure 11 ESATs for security functionality against improper removal of an application
Table 8 A description of fixtures used to test against the “Remove Application” misuse case
Fixture 
#
Type Purpose
1 Action The purpose of this first fixture is to retrieve the access credentials 
and to display the list of active applications. 
2 Row This fixture assumes three applications are present in the system and 
checks for their existence.
3 Action The purpose of this fixture is to select an application and execute a 
remove operation upon it.
4 Row The purpose of this fixture is to check that the removed application is 
no longer active by checking for the other two remaining 
applications.
5 Action This fixture presents part of the mitigation behavior where the 
removed application is added to the “removed application list”. The 
fixture checks that the list is displayed.
6 Row This fixture presents the other part of the mitigation behavior by 
checking the contents of the “removed application list”. The fixture 
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checks that the list contains the removed application as well as the 
user who executed the remove operation. The fixture assumes that 
there was no other previously removed application.
4.1.2 Change Review Decision Illegally – Misuse Case
This misuse case is initiated by the malicious applicant by providing a username that does 
not belong to them (unless the misuser is an insider). The system then provides the list of 
active application. The malicious applicant enters the name or ID of an application and 
the system retrieves it. The malicious applicant then changes decision or review 
previously rendered by a faculty search committee member. The expected mitigation 
behavior is then triggered by the system by emailing the committee chairman with details 
of the change. The chairman can then verify the change and either approve or disapprove 
it. The HLSAT shown in Table 9 was derived based on the behavior of the involved 
mis/use cases (Phase 1). The corresponding security robustness diagram developed is 
shown in Figure 12 (Phase 2). Finally the ESATs developed are shown in Figure 13 
(Phase 3). The ESATs shown below consists of four fixtures. Table 10 provides a brief 
description of the type and purpose of each fixture.
Table 9 The HLSAT for the “Change Review Decision Illegally” misuse case
Test ID Description Expected Results
Change Review 
Decision-Basic Flow
Precondition: Run Faculty 
Search Committee System
Input: Username
Output: The selected 
application has its review 
decision changed.
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Input: Password
Input: ID of application to be 
changed
Input: New status
Input: Chairman username
Input: Old status
Output: The selected 
application has its status 
changed.
Output: An email sent to the 
committee members with the 
details of the change.
Output: The selected 
application has its status 
reverted.
Postcondition: Current Status 
= Old Status
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Figure 12 The security robustness diagram for the “Change Review Decision Illegally” MUC
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ApplicationViewer
Enter ApplicationViewer.CurrentApplication
Press ApplicationViewer.Review()
Press ApplicationViewer.Recommend()
Check Application.Status Recommended
Check Application.isDecisionChange
d
False
Press ApplicationViewer.Review()
Press ApplicationViewer.Reject()
Check Application.Status Rejected
Check Application.isDecisionChanged True
Press Application.addChangeToHistory()
ApplicationViewer
Enter Users.CurrentUser Username
Enter Users.CurrentUser Password
Press ApplicationViewer.DisplayActiveApplications()
Check ApplicationViewer.isDisplayActiveApplications
()
True
ApplicationViewer.ApplicationList.DisplayedApplications
Application-1
Application-2
Application-3
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ApplicationViewer
Enter Users.CurrentUser Committee Member-1
Enter Users.CurrentUser Committee Member-2
Enter Users.CurrentUser Committee Member-3
Enter Users.CurrentUser CommitteeChairman
Press ApplicationViewer.SendChangeDecisionEmail()
Press ApplicationViewer.RejectChange()
Check Application.Status Recommended
Figure 13 ESATs for security functionality against improper overturn of a decision on an application
Table 10  ESATs for security functionality against improper overturn of a decision on an application
Fixture 
#
Type Purpose
1 Action The purpose of this first fixture is to retrieve the access credentials 
and to display the list of active applications. This fixture assumes 
three applications are present in the system.
2 Row This fixture assumes three applications are present in the system 
and checks for their existence.
3 Action This fixture begins with selecting an application for review. The 
application is then recommended. The fixture then executes another 
review where this time the decision has changed from a 
“recommend” to a “reject”.
4 Action This fixture presents the mitigation behavior. The four members of 
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the committee and its chairman are notified with the decision 
change via email. The fixture executes a change reject by the 
chairman and checks that the application’s decision has not 
changed.
4.3 Redirect Review Illegally – Misuse Case
This misuse case is initiated by the malicious applicant by providing a username that does 
not belong to them (unless the misuser is an insider ). The system then provides the list of 
active application. The malicious applicant enters the name or ID of an application and 
the system retrieves it. The malicious applicant provides the name of a new reviewer to 
review the application. The application is assigned a “redirected” status. The expected 
mitigation behavior is then triggered by the system by emailing the committee chairman 
with details of the redirection. The chairman can then verify the change and either 
approve or disapprove it. The HLSAT shown in Table 11 was derived based on the 
behavior of the involved mis/use cases (Phase 1). The corresponding security robustness 
diagram developed is shown in Figure 14 (Phase 2). Finally the EASTs developed are 
shown in Figure 15 (Phase 3). The ESAT shown below consists of four fixtures. Table 12 
provides a brief description of the type and purpose of each fixture.
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Table 11 The HLSAT for the “Remove Application” misuse case
Test ID Description Expected Results
Redirect Review-
Basic Flow
Precondition: Run Faculty 
Search Committee System
Input: Username
Input: Password
Input: ID of application to be 
redirected
Input: New status
Input: Chairman username
Input: Original reviewer
Output: The selected 
application has its review 
decision changed.
Output: The selected 
application has its reviewer 
changed.
Output: An email sent to the 
committee chairman with the 
details of the redirect.
Output: The selected 
application has its reviewer 
change reverted.
Postcondition: Current 
Reviewer = Original 
Reviewer
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Figure 14 The security robustness diagram for the “Redirect Review Illegally” MUC
ApplicationViewer
Enter Users.CurrentUser Username
Enter Users.CurrentUser Password
Press ApplicationViewer.DisplayActiveApplications()
Check ApplicationViewer.isDisplayActiveApplicat
ions()
True
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ApplicationViewer.ApplicationList.DisplayedApplications
Application-1
Application-2
Application-3
ApplicationViewer
Enter ApplicationViewer.CurrentApplication
Enter Users.NewReviewer New Reviewer
Press ApplicationViewer.Redirect()
Check Application.Status Redirected
Check Application.isDecisionChanged False
Press Application.addChangeToHistory()
ApplicationViewer
Enter Users.CurrentUser Committee Chairman
Press ApplicationViewer.SendRedirectEmail()
Press ApplicationViewer.rejectChange()
Check Application.Reviewer Original Reviewer
Figure 15 ESATs for security functionality against improper redirect of an application
Table 12 A description of fixtures used to test against the “Redirect Review Illegally” misuse case
Fixture 
#
Type Purpose
1 Action The purpose of this first fixture is to retrieve the access credentials 
and to display the list of active applications. This fixture assumes 
three applications are present in the system.
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2 Row This fixture assumes three applications are present in the system and 
checks for their existence.
3 Action Misuse behavior is simulated by this fixture by assigning a new 
review to the application before executing a redirect operation.
4 Action This fixture presents the mitigation behavior as the chairman 
committee is informed of the reviewer assignment change via email. 
It simulates the chairman rejecting the change then checks that the 
current reviewer of the application remains as the original reviewer.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUDINGREMARKS
5.1 Limitations
The essential unit of misuse case model is their unstructured textual descriptions. It is 
very hard to create totally automated methods that demand the analysis of unstructured 
natural language. Therefore, human estimation is involved during the application of the 
suggested technique. In specific, human estimation is needed to examine the textual 
descriptions in order to break up the stated behavior into steps, which is an essential step 
to define the usage scenarios, needed inputs and expected outputs. Logically, procedures 
that involve human judgment are subjective. The method is also reliant on the quality of 
the given misuse case and domain models. 
Analyst inspiration. Computer crooks are certainly going to be inventive in their attempts
to cheat the system. Thus analysts want to be similarly inventive to recognize the related 
threats in advance. Therefore, the success of the proposed approach is dependent on the 
skill level of the analysts applying it and the quality of the given models. 
The technique in this thesis suggests that misuse case analysis will be used early in the 
development process. But it might also be a clue to recreate misuse case analysis on a 
more specific level after the system’s security defenses have been selected.This could 
offer a chance to test the defenses and attempt to discover weaknesses. Implementing 
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misuse case analysis on various levels of abstraction and at many stages during the 
development process might raise the chance of removing such hostile surprises
5.2 Conclusion and Future Work
In the thesis we presented an approach to develop acceptance tests for early stage 
validation of functional security requirements. The proposed approach makes use of 
artifacts that are developed at an early stage in the development life cycle; namely the 
domain model and misuse case model. The approach applies the security robustness 
analysis technique on the given domain model and misuse case models. The developed 
acceptance tests are executable and reusable. The acceptance tests are produced in a 
systematic manner to be much more comprehensive in comparison to an ad-hoc approach 
to acceptance tests creation. The feasibility of the proposed approach was demonstrated 
using real-world system – the Faculty Search Committee system used by the Information 
& Computer Science department at King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals, 
Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. 
Tests are first created at high level to serve a dual purpose. Firstly, HLSATs are the basis 
for creating ESATs. Secondly, HLSATs provide a technically simple means for early 
validation of the security requirements, which encourages more involvement by 
customers.HLSATs can be developed at the early stages of the development lifecycle 
without the need to wait for object level information to become available.
Misuse case models adhere to a relatively small set of syntax rules. The core component 
of misuse case models are their unstructured textual descriptions. It is naturally very 
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difficult to devise fully automated approaches that require the analysis of unstructured 
natural language. Therefore, human judgment is required during the application of the 
proposed approach. In particular, human judgment is required to analyze the textual 
descriptions in order to decompose the stated behavior into steps, which is a requisite step 
to determine the usage scenarios, needed inputs and expected outputs. Naturally, 
processes that require human judgment are subjective. The approach is also dependent on 
the quality of the given misuse case and domain models. Therefore, the success of the 
proposed approach is dependent on the skill level of the analysts applying it and the 
quality of the given models. The issue with the reliance on human judgment can be 
remedied by prescribing the use of structured misuse case descriptions, such as the 
SMCD (Structured Misuse Case Descriptions) structure develop in earlier work [El-
Attar-c]. SMCD structured misuse case descriptions will greatly reduce the subjectivity 
issue. Moreover, the use of the SMCD, which was specifically designed to reduce 
inconsistencies in misuse case descriptions, will ensure a certain level of quality better 
than that in unstructured descriptions. Therefore, future work can be directed towards 
modifying and improving the current approach by set it to leverage the SMCD structure.
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